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Introduction
The connection between incentives and outcomes has long found
consistent support in management literature generally (Bartol and
Hagmann 1992; Miller & Schuster 1993; Swinehart 1986) and retailing in
particular (Banker et al. 1996; Team Pay Case Studies 1997). Later metastudies strongly support this view. (Condly, Noe and Jackson 2002;
Garbers and Konradt 2014). Yet, providing performance-based incentives,
at least for rank and file retail employees, still is not common in U.S.
retailing and team-based incentives are even rarer.
The next section of this manuscript describes some of the issues with
individualized commissions, which though not prevalent in a many
product domains, are still dominant in some (cars, furniture and real
estate for example). Then, we use game theory to illustrate how employees
of retailers using team-based incentives might outperform employees who
received no performance incentives and or individualized incentives.

Individualized Incentives
The traditional method of incentivizing retail employees, individualized
commission, is very difficult to manage. Where this system is still extant
(car and furniture retailers still typically have commission structures for
instance), every new customer who comes into the store or lot becomes an
up with ups queued in a more or less formal or informal system.
Customers who ask to speak to a specific salesperson by name are directed
to that person, but everyone else is a critical asset that managers need to
find a way to distribute equitably among their salespeople. Informal
interviews with many of these managers (including a family member who
has run several car dealerships) indicate that managers view it as
critically important and not coincidentally their biggest headache.

Game Theory Scenario 1: Jumping the Customer and the
Pushy Salesperson
In a shopping store in a mall, a home improvement category killer or other
types of stores, the allocation of customer assets among employees would
be very difficult to manage as customers wander from department to

department and browse, then leave the store, then return. Even in a
smaller scale store, a customer might want to browse for a while without
assistance, but then have a question or need other help.
In an individualized commission system salespeople would have a very
strong incentive to jump the customer, attacking her as she first enters
the store and then following her around even if she utters a browsing code
like “just looking.” In a simple game theory situation, you have two
employees who work primarily or substantially on commission. In a set
time period (a shift) 30 customers come in, half of them will buy and half
not. If the selling skill is equal (buyers and non-buyers thus being
randomly distributed), whoever jumps the most customers will sell the
most. A salesperson that hangs out at the front of the store and jumps 20
customers will have an expected sales level double the sales of the other
sales person. In this prisoner-dilemma like situation, both will stay right
at the entrance of the store and jump anyone who steps as much as one
foot inside the door. A corollary to this is that cleaning display cases,
stocking inventory, checking dressing rooms, preventing theft and
performing other tasks which may be critically important to the retailer
organization’s success would be neglected because that type of
contribution does not generate commissions.
Each of the salespeople in this game theory example would also have a
strong incentive to advocate very aggressively for immediate sales. A
typical employee will work at most 35 hours a week, but the retail stores
are typically open more than seventy hours a week (even more during the
Christmas season). So when customers come into the store, the
salesperson’s commission maximizing strategy is to push for a quick sale.
Retail customers, brought up a laissez-faire retailing environment, are not
used to hard closing and sell-now-at-all-costs salespeople. Over twenty
years of teaching retailing I have asked several thousand students how
they react to this type of retail environment. Students often cite as an
example a store in the local mall where salespeople work on commission.
Though there were a significant percentage of students who prefer stores
where salespeople are on commission, the great majority of students have
responded negatively to both jumping and pushiness. While it may be
rationally correct to the salesperson, herself, to aggressively pursue the
immediate sales, most retail organizations rightly feel they will lose more
business in the long term—even if the salesperson achieves success in the
short run.

Team-Based Incentives
Fortunately, modern payroll management techniques allow retailers to tie
payroll to sales revenue, which permits the instituting of collectivized
incentive systems. In the simple example above with two employees of
equal skill and experience, sales commissions on all sales during the shift
would be split evenly by both of them. Banker et al. (2009) call this a

“visible line of sight incentive” arguing that incentives where the employee
cannot easily connect her behavior to the incentive due to scaling issues (a
long time frame or a large pool of people sharing in the distribution) will
not be as effective as incentives where the employee feels there is a direct
connection between her contribution and her reward. This team-based
incentive would solve the jumping issue right away, as neither would get
any advantage by gaining customers at the expense of the other. It would
also greatly attenuate the incentive to aggressively push for a quick sale
and more closely align workers incentives with the retail organization’s
long-term goals (e.g. repeat patronage, customer satisfaction) while
simultaneously taking away the disincentive to spend time on important
tasks not directly related to sales.

Game Theory Scenario 2: Unequal Skills Distribution
Collectivized incentive systems also allow for more specialization. Take
the situation described before, but this time let’s make one worker more
skilled and experienced and designate the other as a rookie or trainee. The
workers receive a base salary, but also receive a short line of sight team
incentive wherein commissions on all sales go into a pool to be shared by
all workers clocked in at that store when the sale occurred. Just as
strikers command more salary than backs on football team, experienced
workers can be given more shares and take on more complex tasks while
newer, less skilled, less experienced workers would be given fewer shares.
Pirates and privateers had a detailed, but fixed system of splitting shares
where a bosun’s mate got more than able bodied seamen who got more
than idlers, wasters and cabin boys. In an age of tremendous prejudice,
Moby Dick’s dark skinned, pagan harpooner, Queequec, signed on for a
30th part of profits while our intrepid interpreter Ismael felt lucky to get a
300th part. In the retailing example our skilled worker might get 1.5
shares while the rookie got a half-share. Since who does what in any
particular situation does not make any difference in terms of pay to each
employee who does what in any particular example, the experienced
employee would spend most of her time with customers while the other
employee might focus on lower level skills like running the cash register
and only help customers when necessary. Unskilled workers would have
an incentive to learn and grow as employees by observing the more skilled
employees. In this game theory example, the more skilled employee would
have an incentive to mentor, coach and otherwise help the rookie
employee because in situations where two or more customers enter the
store at once, the skilled employee’s remuneration is directly impacted by
how well the rookie handles her customers.
To see how this might play out in game theory, let’s say four customers
come in at once with one kicking the tires type of customer who only wants
to browse, (Browser), two goal directed shoppers who will need minimal
assistance, and one high maintenance, but high reward customer (Queen).
In an individual commission scenario the rookie might jump the Queen or

a regularized up system might randomly assign customers to salespeople
in a sub-optimal way. Customers 3 and 4 would normally have to wait
until the salespeople had finished helping the first two customers, an
arrangement that might not suit the Queen. With a team incentive where
each employee got a share of the sale while on the clock no matter who
actually helped the customer or actually closed the sale, game theory
would suggest the probability of optimization is much greater. It might
involve the high skill employee helping the Queen with the rookie focusing
on the providing the minimal assistance necessary for the self directed
shoppers while letting the Browser look around by herself until she
indicated that she needed assistance. In this and other situations team
rewards incentivize salespeople to switch allocations (called TOing in sales
jargon) if it became clear that they had initially misjudged the customers,
suggest accessories beyond the original purchase need (Upselling),
optimize task allocation (with the rookie focusing on routine tasks and the
skilled employee complex interpersonal challenges) and practice other
advanced techniques which lead to increased sales, enhanced customer
satisfaction and greater work flow efficiency. At the same time, the
maladaptive behaviors reinforced by individualized commissions described
in Scenario 1 would be less likely to occur.

Game Theory Scenario 3: Free Riding
One frequent criticism of team-based rewards is the issue of the free-rider.
Marketing and business students have a lot of experience with group
projects where one or more person does not do their part. My retailing
students have an assignment where they write about their current boss’s
biggest weakness/mistake/failure. Their managers’ inability or
unwillingness to do any about a “lazy, good for nothing” fellow employee
has always been the most common or second most common theme for the
twenty years I have been reading/grading that assignment.
In this game theory example, the retailing domain is a DIY store with six
separate departments, but only one centralized set of checkout counters.
Typical staffing at any given point in time would involve about one or two
sales specialist staffing each department, but with the store open over 100
hours a week, at least four 35 hour a week employees would be needed for
each department. In four of the six departments all of the employees are
very good, competent, helpful and enthusiastic, but in two of the
departments one employee is both technically incompetent and poorly
motivated (or even motivated to do bad things like be rude to customers).
Under an individual incentive system where each employee receives a
bonus for his or her sales, the two departments with a single poor
employee will suffer poor sales results. His co-employees may notice what
is going on. They may hear negative comments from customers to whom
he was rude or they may see examples of sloth or recognize incompetence
or poor judgment in product recommendations. Nevertheless, they have

little rational incentive to investigate, take an account of or report things
to management. Management might notice of the problem employee or
they might not and they might do something to fix it or they might not. If
we designate the probability of discovery as α and the probability of
effective intervention designated as σ, then the probability of solving the
problem is α times σ. In a team-based incentive arrangement where
substantial bonuses are given for attaining departmental sales targets and
other goals, the malcontent’s co-employees would have a strong incentive
to identify the poor worker and to seek a within group solution (demand
that he shape up or else) or bring the issue to management and press them
to do something about it. Thus, both α (identification of the poor employee)
and σ (management fixing the problem) would be greater in a team reward
system than it would under the individualized (or a zero incentive) system.

Conclusion, Limitations and Future Research
The game theory examples explained in this manuscript describe realistic
but artificial scenarios where game theory suggests team-based incentive
systems would lead to improved performance. Nevertheless, the scope of
application may not be extensive and there are certainly retail task
environments where the implications do not apply. In retail product
domains like furniture, automobiles and residential real estate the single
agent, straight commission model has prevailed for many years and is
likely to continue. A Walmart or a chain grocery store will be unlikely to
implement short line of sight, team-level incentives because rank and file
employees have simple task environments, and customers primarily make
routine, low involvement purchase decisions.
Similarly, retailers would be hesitant to implement a short line of sight
team incentive in countries or states where the minimum wage is close to
or above the typical marginal revenue product for retailers’ rank and file
employees. Though currently in most of the U.S., the minimum wage is
very low relatively and even large scale employers with the simplest skill
requirements like McDonalds and Walmart have recently (and very
publicly) raised wages, some states and cities have much higher minimum
wages. Our game theory examples thus suggest that team-based
incentives will work best in (1) task environments where skill, ability and
drive significantly impact sales, customer satisfaction and other outcomes
(2) the worker can connect her behavior and that of her immediate
colleagues to tangible rewards and (3) the marginal revenue product for a
typical rank and file employee is high enough to permit significant
incentivization.
This manuscript also did not compare large to moderate to small levels of
incentives or describe the optimal method of distribution (other than to
say it did not have to be equal). It also did not take into account myriad
potential moderating variables other than product domain and task

environment. More theoretical and empirical research is clearly needed to
answer these questions.

.
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